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SELECTED OIL AND GAS DECISIONS
Federal

showed that the Seller received ample notice of
possible differing interpretations of the agreement, so
evidence of intent would have had little probative
value compared to those facts. Last, the court found
that the transfer of the wells was appropriate because
bad faith actors may not offset the expenses incurred
in the offending operations.

3d Circuit
Del. Riverkeeper Network v. Sec’y Pennsylvania Dep’t
of Env’t Prot., 833 F.3d 360 (3d Cir. 2016).
Environmental conservation groups challenged permits
issued by the Pennsylvania and New Jersey
Departments of Environmental Protection (“NJDEP”
and “PADEP,” respectively) for a natural gas pipeline
expansion. Although the states held the power to
oversee environmental permitting processes, the court
claimed jurisdiction to review the federally required
permits. On the merits, the court found that neither
agency acted arbitrarily or capriciously because they (1)
adequately considered alternatives, even adopting some
and explaining rejection of others; (2) balanced
concerns for endangered species against the
practicalities of the project; and (3) minimized
economic impact by using existing rights-of-way.
Finally, any errors made were not prejudicial to the
environmental groups because the project did not begin
until the operator received all applicable federal
authorizations, including preliminary water quality
certification, which required full environmental impact
review. As a result, the court found the agencies had
appropriately issued the permits and denied the
environmental groups’ petitions.

10th Circuit
Trans-Western Petroleum, Inc. v. U.S. Gypsum Co.,
830 F.3d 1171 (10th Cir. 2016).
A prospective lessee called a lessor to inquire about
top-leasing the lessor’s minerals upon expiration of
an ongoing assignment. The lessor executed a lease
with the prospective lessee, but the assignee
protested, claiming the lease remained valid, so the
lessor rescinded the lease. The prospective lessee file
suit against the assignee seeking declaratory
judgment that the lease expired, and the court agreed.
The prospective lessee also filed a second amended
complaint seeking damages against the lessor for
breach of contract and breach of the covenant of quiet
enjoyment, requesting expectation damages because
of the missed opportunity to assign the lease early in
its primary term at the market’s peak. The lessor, in
contrast, argued that courts should measure damages
for breach of an oil and gas lease, like any real
property, at the date of the breach. The federal district
court sided with the lessor but noted that Utah state
courts had yet to address damages for an oil and gas
lease. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit certified the
question of expectation damages to the Utah Supreme
Court, which directed the Tenth Circuit to measure
general (or direct) damages “as the difference
between the contract price of the lease and the market
value of the lease at the time of the breach” and
consequential (or special) damages as those
reasonably foreseeable by the parties at the contract’s
execution—by the gains that the promised
performance could produce or the loss produced by
the absence of such performance. Therefore, the
Tenth Circuit remanded the issue of consequential
damages for recalculation.

6th Circuit
Journey Acquisition-II, L.P. v. EQT Prod. Co., 830 F.3d
444 (6th Cir. 2016).
An oil and gas producer (“Purchaser”) sued its
predecessor (“Seller”) for alleged continued operation
on some conveyed land that Seller had not intended to
transfer. The trial court granted summary judgement for
the Purchaser, finding an unambiguous description of
properties in the transfer and a willful, bad faith
trespass by the Seller. The award included prejudgment
interest and the transfer to the Purchaser of the Seller’s
interest in the trespassing wells. On appeal, the Seller
challenged the decision on the merits for ambiguity and
the preclusion at trial of testimony regarding the
Seller’s intent. The appellate court affirmed the trial
court’s finding that the sale agreement was
unambiguous; other less clear provisions in the
agreement did not contradict this interpretation. The
court also found no abuse of discretion by excluding
testimony regarding the Seller’s intent because facts

D.C. Circuit
Petro Star Inc. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n,
835 F.3d 97 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
A federal district court concluded that the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) acted
arbitrarily and capriciously after dismissing an oil
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company’s petition that challenged the FERC’s
methodology for determining the value of “resid” crude
oil commingled in a pipeline’s common stream. In
2013, FERC began an investigation into resid pricing
during which time an oil company challenged the
agency’s methodology, arguing that the formula used
undervalues resid in an unjust and unreasonable manner
by including a capital recovery factor. The FERC
rejected the oil company’s challenge without
meaningful response to evidence presented by the oil
company and further concluded that the oil company’s
failure to provide a viable alternative methodology was
itself an independent ground for its decision. The court
concluded, by applying Tesoro Alaska Petroleum Co. v.
FERC, 234 F.3d 1286 (D.C. Cir. 2000), that the oil
company’s evidence suggesting undervaluation
established a prima facie case warranting reexamination of the resid valuation formula and a
meaningful response.

Indiana
Schuchman/Samberg Invs., Inc. v. Hoosier Penn Oil
Co., Inc., 58 N.E.3d 241 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
The owner of a contaminated site sued the site’s
former operators under Indiana’s Environmental
Legal Actions statute (“ELA”) and Petroleum
Releases statute (“PR”) to recover expenses for
remedial work. The owner had noticed stained soil
before purchasing the property and became aware of
environmental reports shortly afterward but failed to
file its complaint for ten years. The former operators
filed a motion for partial summary judgement,
arguing that the owner’s ELA claim was untimely
and the PR claim was invalid. The trial court granted
the motion. On interlocutory appeal, the court
affirmed, first addressing whether the appropriate
statute of limitations (“SOL”) for the ELA claim was
six years (Indiana’s requirement for damage to real
property) or ten years (Indiana’s catch-all statute of
limitations). The owner argued for the latter because
its claim was one of contribution. The court decided
that a contribution claim must originate from a party
already found liable for damage; rather, the owner
sought to recover for property damage. Therefore, the
Court applied the six-year SOL to determine that the
owner, who had early knowledge of possible
contamination, failed to file a timely complaint.
Additionally, the court found that Indiana’s PR
unambiguously permits recovery of costs for
remediation only by the State, not private parties.
Therefore, the owner could not recover under the PR.

State
Georgia
Columbia Cas. Co. v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 790
S.E.2d 645 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016).
Insurer appealed the trial court’s grant of Insured’s
motion for summary judgment regarding coverage for a
pipeline leak. Insured sued Insurer to recover money it
had spent to settle claims and remediate soil
contamination traceable to a pipeline leak that Insured
had immediately repaired. At the time of the leak,
Insurer agreed to indemnify Insured for losses
exceeding the limits of Insured’s underlying policy, and
the underlying policy covered “occurrences taking
place during its policy period.” Insurer argued that
because of the progressive nature of environmental
contamination, Insurer should allocate the losses across
the several policies issued to the Insured over the three
decades that contamination accrued. Insurer reasoned
that its policy would not trigger under this approach
because the losses per policy would not exceed the
limits of the policy. The underlying policy, however,
covered the leak because it took place during the policy
period. Thus, the court of appeals affirmed the trial
court and held that allocation was not at issue because
Insured’s policy, by its plain terms, covered the leak
and resulting damages.

New Mexico
Ulibarri v. Southland Royalty Co., LLC, No. CIV 1600215, 2016 WL 3946800 (D.N.M. July 20, 2016).
A royalty owner in natural gas wells commenced a
putative class action against an out-of-state natural
gas company alleging that, under the “marketable
condition rule” (“MCR”), the company had a duty to
bear post-production costs, including the natural gas
processors tax (“NGPT”), of putting gas into
marketable condition. First, the court acknowledged
the State’s longstanding recognition of implied
covenants. Before the court could consider whether
an implied duty to market includes MCR, the court
had to determine if the contract at issue included a
duty to market. In doing so, the court found no
support under state law to imply MCR in a
contract. Therefore, the company may deduct postproduction costs from royalties for processing natural
gas into marketable condition. Second, the court
noted the owner’s failure to offer authority
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supporting its proposed construction of NGPT and that,
based on legislative history, the legislature modified the
statute for efficient tax collection from a handful of
processors rather than numerous royalty and working
interest owners—not to exclude those royalty owners
from a fair portion of the tax. Therefore, Owners share
in the NGPT burden as a form of royalty deduction to
cover reimbursement to processor who had to pay that
tax.

public utility corporation, regulation of the intrastate
activity by the state, and demonstration of a public
need. Though condemnees claim the pipeline is an
interstate pipeline subject to federal regulation, the
owner received approval from the state Public Utility
Commission (“PUC”). Furthermore, the state
certificated the owner and regulated its actions of
intrastate service in seventeen counties, including the
movement of natural gas liquids. Therefore, the
owner is an intrastate public utility corporation
actively regulated by the state. The demonstration of
a public need is under the jurisdiction of PUC rather
than the courts, and PUC determined the transport of
natural gas liquids within the state meets the public
demand for fuel during winter. The objections to the
condemnation of easements were all overruled.

North Dakota
Horob v. Zavanna, LLC, 2016 ND 168, 883 N.W.2d
855.
North Dakota’s Supreme Court concluded that a lease
may remain in effect under the terms of a
communitization agreement even after a halt in
production triggers the cessation of production clause.
Upon learning of a well’s recent lapse in production, oil
and gas lessors sued lessees claiming the lease expired
under a cessation of production clause. The lease
covered a 1,057.72-acre area for ten years and as long
thereafter as oil or gas was produced. If production
stopped, the lease would terminate within sixty days
unless the lessee commenced additional drilling or
reworking. A well was drilled on a spacing unit
containing part of the leased acreage. Acreage owned
by lessors was pooled with federal lands pursuant to a
communitization agreement. An oil company leased
and operated a well on a 160-acre spacing unit
containing 40 acres of the lessors’ property, with the
remaining acreage belonging to the United States. As a
result, the court concluded that the lease agreement
remained active because the agreement stated that
production from it constituted production as to each
lease committed to the agreement and because the lease
agreement at issue did not contain a Pugh clause that
would otherwise allow for severability of noncommunitized portions of a lease.

Texas
Combest v. Mustang Minerals, LLC, No. 04-1500617-CV, 2016 WL 4124066 (Tex. App. Aug. 3,
2016).
Grantors conveyed land to Grantee by warranty deed,
expressly reserving an undivided one-half interest in
the underlying minerals. Grantee interpreted the deed
language to mean that Grantors had merely reserved
an interest in the minerals conveyed, but the Grantors
argued that the deed had not conveyed an interest in
minerals at all. Later, Operator executed an oil and
gas lease with Grantors’ successor-in-interest, who
then conveyed the interest to LLC. Operator also
executed a lease with Grantee, and both lessors
received royalty payments after Operator pooled the
leases. The dispute arose when Operator ceased
making payments to Grantee after LLC claimed
ownership of the entire mineral estate. In response,
Grantee brought a trespass-to-try-title action, and the
trial court granted summary judgment for LLC. On
appeal, Grantee argued that the trial court
misinterpreted the language of the deed or, in the
alternative, that the deed was ambiguous. The court
of appeals addressed whether the deed reserved a
fraction of the minerals under the land conveyed or,
instead, the land described. The court sided with LLC
and held that, in light of the entire deed, Grantors
reserved a fraction of the minerals from the land
described such that Grantee received no mineral
interest. Further, the court rejected Grantee’s
argument that the deed was ambiguous on its face
and affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

Pennsylvania
In re Sunoco Pipeline, L.P., 143 A.3d 1000 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2016).
A pipeline owner and operator sought to condemn
multiple permanent, non-exclusive easements and
temporary workspace easements for maintenance and
expansion of pipeline. Condemnees claimed the owner
had no power to condemn because it failed to meet
requirements for a public utility, including
categorization as an intrastate pipeline, status as a
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SELECTED WATER DECISIONS
Federal

continuing violation of the treaties by both
governments. The federal district court did not err in
issuing an injunction for the state to correct the
culverts because it took into consideration multiple
causes of decline in salmon and courses to reverse the
extensive effect of the culverts. The Ninth Circuit
therefore affirmed decisions in favor of the tribes,
including objections to the breadth of the injunction,
the cost to the state, and a question of federalism.

9th Circuit
Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 830 F.3d 975
(9th Cir. 2016).
The Ninth Circuit granted the operator of metal smelter
an interlocutory appeal to determine whether the
operator arranged for "disposal" of air emissions from
smelter smokestacks within the meaning of the
Comprehensive
Environmental
Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"). The
operator was amidst litigation with certain tribal nations
regarding a different form of waste disposal when the
tribal nations amended the complaint to add a CERCLA
claim. The operator moved to strike or dismiss because
CERCLA provides no foundation for liability under
such allegations. The lower court denied the
motions. One month later, after the court released an
opinion interpreting "disposal" as used in the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA") to similar
circumstances, the operator moved for reconsideration,
arguing that CERCLA cross-references RCRA's
definition of "disposal," foreclosing the tribal nations’
air pathway claims. The lower court denied the motion.
On interlocutory appeal, the Ninth Circuit concluded
that "disposal" does not include the gradual spread of
contaminants without human intervention, as explained
in the RCRA case; therefore, the operator did not
arrange for "disposal" of hazardous substances under
CERCLA that resulted in airborne emissions
contaminating land and water downwind.

D.C. Circuit
Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. EPA, 829 F.3d 710 (D.C.
Cir. 2016).
A mining company brought suit against the EPA for
the revocation of a permit to dispose of various
mining byproducts in an area previously approved by
a separate federal agency. The D.C. Circuit first
established the EPA’s jurisdiction to grant and revoke
the relevant discharge permits. The court ran through
three separate analyses for the proper revocation of
the permit. First, the mining company forfeited the
argument based on their reliance costs for failing to
have raised them in the administrative hearing or at
the trial court level. Second, the EPA properly acted
under its authority to regulate adverse impacts on
wildlife populations, while not overstepping the
authority of the state agency to regulate municipal
water quality. The EPA did not act outside of its
congressionally mandated authority, and so the
mining company’s argument that the EPA’s action
was capricious fails. Finally, the court found that the
EPA met the proper justification standards, even the
heightened standard argued by the mining company,
to revoke the permit, despite approving the permit
previously. New data collected since the previous
approval supports the EPA’s current revocation of the
permit.

United States v. Washington, 827 F.3d 836 (9th Cir.
2016).
The United States, on behalf of twenty-one Native
American tribes, brought a complaint against the state
of Washington seeking an injunction for violating
treaties, which guaranteed off-reservation fishing rights,
by building culverts that prevent mature salmon from
returning to spawning grounds, juvenile salmon from
going out to sea, and young salmon from escaping
predators. Washington denied the treaties provided a
cause of action for damage, but the Supreme Court
viewed these treaties as the tribes would naturally
understand them. Given the tribes’ central need of
fishing salmon and the governor’s promise to the tribes
of food and drink forever, the court decided the treaties
protect the tribes’ rights to both fish and be free from
damages by Washington to the supply of fish. Culverts
built by the state and the United States that block
several hundred thousand salmon constituted a

State
California
Bay Area Clean Env’t, Inc. v. Santa Clara Cty., 207
Cal. Rptr. 3d 334 (Ct. App. 2016), reh'g denied (Sept.
22, 2016), review filed (Oct. 11, 2016).
A non-profit, environmental organization brought
writ of mandate against a county challenging
approval of a quarry reclamation plan under the
Surface Mining and Reclamation Act (“SMARA”)
and the California Environmental Quality Act
(“CEQA”). The non-profit brought claims regarding
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water quality and harm to downstream wildlife,
specifically an endangered frog. The reclamation plan,
along with an environmental impact report, faced a
public review period for compliance with relevant
regulation before certification. The non-profit claimed
selenium levels in the water would increasingly degrade
over the twenty-year reclamation period; however, the
court found SMARA accepts a decline in water quality
if necessary to complete a reclamation plan. Another
claimed violation was the environmental impact
report’s failure to mention the endangered frog, but the
court held that the county’s analysis on downstream
aquatic wildlife was sufficient. Furthermore, the court
found the existence of a plan for a new quarry has no
effect on the reclamation plan for the current quarry
because the reclamation is a standalone project that
meets CEQA requirements independently as opposed to
a first phase in a larger development. Thus, the county
properly certified the reclamation plan and the
environmental report.

Montana
Kelly v. Teton Prairie LLC, 376 P.3d 143 (Mont.
2016).
On three separate occasions, the senior appropriators
of the Teton River made calls upon the upstream
junior appropriators to stop diverting their water. The
district court granted an injunction. The company
appealed. In Montana, the prior appropriation
doctrine establishes which individual’s right to water
is senior to another individual’s rights. Here, the
company’s rights were junior. The court held that
senior appropriators do not have to make calls in
order of seniority amongst the junior appropriators,
that if any water could make it to the senior
appropriators the call was not futile, and lastly, that
the court has jurisdiction over water distribution
matters. The company had to stop diverting water and
was liable for any damages it caused to the senior
appropriators by ignoring the call.

Colorado
Mack v. Anderson, 2016 MT 204, 384 Mont. 368,
380 P.3d 730, reh'g denied (Sept. 28, 2016).

Indian Mountain Corp. v. Indian Mountain Metro.
Dist., No. 15CA1055, 2016 WL 4249745 (Ct. App.
Colo. Div. I. Aug. 11, 2016).

A property owner (“Owner”) brought suit against
adjacent property owners (“Neighbor”) seeking an
injunction for Neighbor to remove the dam diverting
and blocking water flow at the point of diversion
(“POD”). When Owner attempted maintenance on
the ditch, Neighbor filed a complaint that Owner did
not get appropriate permits; Owner later attempted to
comply with the permit complaints, but Neighbor
hindered them from working on the ditch by filling it
with gravel. The district court granted a preliminary
injunction for Owner to gain access to the POD and
along the ditch that crossed Neighbor’s land for
installation and maintenance. Neighbor appealed,
arguing that the district erred by determining the
POD, a decision usually reserved for Water Court.
Montana’s Supreme Court determined the district
court did not abuse its discretion to correctly
maintain the status quo by allowing Owner use of his
undisputed water rights through access to the POD.
The Supreme Court reasoned that ditch or easement
rights are decidedly separate from water rights, and
the district court has the authority to supervise
distribution of appropriated water rights.

A subdivision developer’s successor allegedly held
legal title to water rights and the water augmentation
plan (“Plan”) for the benefit of a subdivision and sought
compensation for the water services it provided to the
subdivision (“District”). The District filed a counterclaim seeking judgment against the successor, claiming
that lot owners rightfully owned both the Plan and
water rights as beneficiaries of constructive trust under
a theory of unjust enrichment. The trial court ruled in
the District’s favor imposing a constructive trust as a
remedy. The successor appealed. The appellate court
reversed the trial court’s decision. The court concluded
(1) the successor did not benefit at the District’s
expense; (2) the successor’s retention of the water
rights and Plan is not unjust because the District
stipulated to never having paid the original developer
for water services; and (3) the successor’s retention of
water rights would not be unjust because local
government agencies would hold the successor
accountable for failure to comply with particulars of the
Plan and because lot owners may opt into the Plan.
Therefore, the costs related to the Plan were not part of
sales price for subdivision lots such that the successor
did not benefit from lot owners and was not unjustly
enriched by seeking reimbursement from lot owners for
costs affiliated with operating the Plan.

416
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol2/iss4/3

New Mexico

North Dakota

Christopher v. Owens, No. 34,588, 2016 WL 4447516
(N.M. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2016).

In re 2015 Application for Permit to Enter Land for
Surveys & Examination Associated with a Proposed
N. Dakota Diversion & Associated Structures, 2016
ND 165, 883 N.W.2d 844.

Individuals bought land with a natural water spring on
it (“Rancher”). In the warranty deed, the seller retained
a fifty-percent interest in the water on the ranch. The
seller later sold his fifty-percent interest to another
party (“Water Assignee”) via a warranty deed. After the
seller filed for an application to appropriate those
waters from the ranch, the Rancher filed a complaint
against the seller and the Water Assignee seeking a
declaration that the seller’s attempt to reserve an
interest in the warranty deed was null because he did
not seek approval of appropriations in that water source
while he owned the property, and therefore the Water
Assignee had no interest in the water source either. The
district court agreed that the seller had no interest in the
water. Additionally, the Water Assignee cross-claimed
against the seller for breach of his warranty deed to
convey and defend proper title. The district court
dismissed the Water Assignee’s claim. The appellate
court, however, held that the seller did reserve a
cognizable interest in the water source—not as the
traditional, appropriated, certified water rights but as a
right to pursue the development or perfection of such
water rights. Therefore, the court held that the seller
and Rancher could divide that interest between them.
The appellate court did not view the case on a
regulation basis but rather on the contractual terms
between the buyer and seller. The appellate court
reversed and remanded to the district for further
proceedings.

Water
Resource
District
(“District”)
filed
applications with the district court to enter
landowners’ property to obtain soil samples for a
proposed flood control project. The landowners
objected, claiming the entry onto their property was a
taking of private property per the North Dakota
Constitution and requested a jury to determine the
compensation for entering their lands. The district
court granted the District the authority to enter the
landowners’ real property, and the landowners
appealed. Landowners claimed under the North
Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure (“N.D.R.Civ.P.”)
that the District must serve eminent domain summons
before the district court could have jurisdiction. The
Supreme Court of North Dakota held that the District
sought entry onto land under North Dakota Century
Code (“N.D.C.C.”) Chapter 32-15, which falls under
a specific exemption within the N.D.R.Civ.P. The
exemption rule allows a district court to permit
examinations like a soil sample because the entry
onto the land was preliminary to a condemnation
action. Therefore, the Court did not require the
eminent domain summons and instead held the
district court had proper subject matter jurisdiction.
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SELECTED WIND DECISIONS
Federal

determine whether the sea floor could support
windmills. The court vacated the previous EIS and
required the Bureau to add the necessary information
to the EIS before any construction could begin. The
Conservationists also claimed a violation of the ESA
because the Bureau’s incidental take statement
excluded a specific bird migration measure. The court
held the Bureau violated the ESA when it refused to
examine the Conservationists’ submission to alter
wind turbine use in times of low visibility or at night
to cut back on the amount of endangered birds harmed
by the windmills. Thus, the appellate court reversed
and remanded the district court’s decision on the
violation of NEPA and ESA.

9th Circuit
Helping Hand Tools v. EPA, 836 F.3d 999 (9th Cir.
2016).
Environmental groups brought suit for review of the
EPA’s grant of a Prevention of Significant
Deterioration permit (“PSD”) for the construction of a
new biomass-burning power plant to a lumber
company. The Ninth Circuit reviewed two issues
specifically cited by the environmental groups: (1) the
determination of the primary purpose for the project
and (2) the allowance of the mixed fuel source. First
the court found that the EPA took a “hard look” at the
purpose for the project and properly found that the
project’s primary purpose was to use biomass waste
produced in and around the plant, as proposed by the
Lumber Company. Second, the court reviewed the
company’s ability to use a clean energy source rather
than the “dirty” biomass fuel. Here, the Ninth Circuit
made a finer distinction that, although natural gas
might be a cleaner fuel, it falls outside the business of
the lumber company. Therefore, the EPA did not
abuse discretion by granting the lumber company’s
permit.

State
Illinois
Ill. Landowners All., NFP v. Illinois Commerce
Comm’n, 2016 IL App (3d) 150099.
Company applied for public utility status in Illinois
before starting construction of a high voltage
transmission line that would run from northeast Iowa
to northwest Illinois. After the Illinois Commerce
Commission (“Commission”) granted the Company
public utility status under the Public Utilities Act
(“Act”), the Illinois Landowners Alliance, Illinois
Agricultural Association or Illinois Farm Bureau, and
Commonwealth Edison Company (“Petitioners”)
challenged the order granting the public utility status.
The Petitioners claim that the Company is not a public
utility under the Act and no substantial evidence
existed supporting the Commission’s decision. The
court determined under the Act that, to gain public
utility status, a company must (1) own, control, or
manage utility assets within the state and (2) offer its
assets to the public without discrimination. The court
found that the Company did not own, manage, or
operate any assets in Illinois. Additionally, the
Company’s proposed transmission line would be
discriminatory. The court ruled for the Petitioners,
stating that the Commission did not have the authority
to grant public utility status to the Company.

D.C. Circuit
Pub. Employees for Envtl. Responsibility v. Hopper,
827 F.3d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
Conservation
organizations
(“Conservationists”)
brought suit against the government claiming the
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (“Bureau”)
violated several federal statutes in permitting an
energy company to lease land off the coast of
Massachusetts to erect windmills. The Bureau
allegedly violated the National Environmental Policy
Act (“NEPA”) and the Endangered Species Act
(“ESA”). The district court dismissed the claims and
granted summary judgment to the Bureau. The
Conservationist appealed, disputing the Bureau’s
decision to lease without first procuring specific
information about the sea floor. The Conservationists
claimed the Bureau only used limited geological
surveys as a basis for their decision to lease, violating
NEPA. Even though the Bureau did issue an
environmental impact statement (“EIS”), the D.C.
Circuit held the Bureau violated NEPA by not
sufficiently obtaining enough geological data to
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The court also denied the argument that PUC was
acting in a “dual role” or on a “continuum of
responsibility” amidst the natural disaster because
private electric utilities in the area faced the same
hurricane-related issues. The court concluded that it is
not the “size of the task,” but rather the “nature of the
responsibility,” that determines whether an action is
governmental or proprietary.

New York
Heeran v. Long Island Power Auth., 2016 N.Y. Slip
Op. 05486 (N.Y. App. Div.).
Homeowners sued a public utility company (“PUC”)
for negligence to recover for property damage
sustained after a hurricane caused an electrical fire.
Homeowners claimed that, based on the declaration of
emergency and evacuation order announced in
anticipation of the hurricane, PUC should have
foreseen that live electrical transmission lines would
catch fire and property damage would occur. PUC and
its subsidiary filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that
PUC was immune from liability because it performed
a “governmental function” in deciding not to shut off
the area’s electricity. The trial court denied the motion
to dismiss, and the court of appeals affirmed. The
court reasoned that although the state legislature
created the PUC, the PUC’s clear purpose was to serve
as a substitute for private electricity companies. And
because providing electricity has traditionally been a
proprietary function, the court held that PUC was not
immune under the governmental function exception.
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SELECTED AGRICULTURE DECISIONS
Federal

held that the application of the 2004 control date did
not violate the statute’s requirement to consider
“present” participation in fishery.

9th Circuit
Pac. Coast Fed'n of Fishermen's Ass’ns v. United
States Dep't of the Interior, No. 14-15514, 2016 WL
3974183 (9th Cir. July 25, 2016).

Pesticide Action Network N. Am. v. EPA, No. 1471514, 2016 WL 3619950 (9th Cir. July 5, 2016).
Organization sought review in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit regarding the
Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) denial
of an administrative petition. The petition requested
that the EPA, for the protection of local children,
adopt interim prohibitions on toxic pesticides near
places where children congregate for fear of pesticide
drift. Organization argued that substantial evidence
does not exist to support denial of the petition. The
Ninth Circuit disagreed, and denied Organization’s
petition for review. The court agreed with the EPA
that imposing express prohibitions was not the proper
method for mitigating the risk of exposure given the
numerous factors involved in pesticide drift and
would direct limited agency funds away from
established safety procedures. Moreover, the court
sided with the EPA for its conclusion that the
proposed course would not address the purported risk
without unreasonably reducing other safe uses of
pesticides.

Environmental associations (“Associations”) brought
suit under the National Environmental Policy Act
(“NEPA”) challenging approval by the Bureau of
Reclamation (“Agency”) regarding the interim
renewal contracts that authorize delivery of water
from federal reclamation facilities to certain water
districts served by a federal water management
project (“Project”). The Associations claimed that the
environmental assessment (“EA”) was inadequate
and that the agencies should have prepared an
environmental impact statement (“EIS”). The federal
district court ruled against the Associations, which
then appealed. A federal circuit court held that the
agencies' EA did not comply with NEPA because it
contained a “no action” alternative regarding
continued delivery of water from federal reclamation
facilities to state water districts under the project
during
interim
contracts
renewal
periods.
Additionally, the Agency’s decision not to give full
and meaningful consideration to the alternative of a
reduction in maximum interim contract water
qualities constituted an abuse of discretion. Last, the
EA’s geographic scope was sufficient such that
requiring the agencies to trace the incremental effects
of each water service contract on waterways subject
to the project would be impractical.

State
Arizona
McCarthy Integrated Sys., LLC v. Evoqua Water
Techs., 379 P.3d 263 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016).
A company entered into a contract with supplier for
aftermarket parts that the company was then going to
resell for use in chlorination machines. In the contract
was a termination clause, which stated that only the
supplier could terminate the contract for cause in the
first year, but after the first year, either party could
terminate the contract with thirty days’ notice. The
supplier gave thirty days’ notice of their desire to
terminate the contract in its fifth year. The company
sued, believing the termination to be wrongful under
the Equipment Dealers Act (“EDA”), which prohibits
suppliers from terminating contracts with dealers
without cause, regardless of the contract terms. But
the court held that the EDA only applied to
agricultural machinery, and therefore not these
chlorination machine parts, and granted summary
judgment to the supplier.

Pacific Dawn LLC v. Pritzker, 831 F.3d 1166 (9th
Cir. 2016).
A fish harvester brought action against the National
Marine Fisheries Services (“NMFS”) for limiting its
share of allowable catch on the activities of 2003 and
2004 rather than years closer to 2010 when NMFS
issued the regulation. The limitations require council
to consider the participant’s present and historical
harvests and investments in and dependence on the
fishery, with the objective of choosing the plan with
the least disruption of current domestic fishing
practices. To cause the least disruption, the council
chose a control date in 2003. NMFS argued that
abandoning the control date would signal to parties
subject to the limitations to increase activity for later
consideration of “present” use to determine their
allowable catch. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of NMFS, and the appellate court
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damages outside of the takings clause, if provided
with a jury trial on damages. Furthermore, the
geological testing of drilling and refilling holes
would not be a permanent appropriation or damaging
of property. Regardless, the statute provides adequate
compensation for permanent damage or appropriation
and therefore does not violate the state takings clause.

California
Friends of the Hastain Trail v. Coldwater Dev. LLC,
205 Cal. Rptr. 3d 270 (2016).
Users of two different private trails brought action
seeking to deem the trails a public easement. The
trails initially served as roads for Los Angeles fire
departments to use to fight wildfires. The trial court
created a public easement by implied dedication
because the public used the trails for five continuous
years before the landowners’ purchase. The trial
court said the predecessors in ownership of the land
had impliedly dedicated an easement to the public by
not halting the use of the trails. On appeal, the
landowners argued that the trial court applied the
wrong law and the court should relocate the easement
to serve equity so that the landowners may develop
their land. The appellate court held that the trial court
applied the proper test and that, to meet that test, the
claimant must show the public used the private land
as one would typically use public land. A substantial
number of people must use the land without
requesting permission or being deprived of use by the
owners. The appellate court held that the trail users
failed to meet that burden because only a handful of
people testified to using both trails during the five
years. Additionally, the appellate court held that the
creation of the trails by the fire department was a
limited public use that could not have placed the land
owners on constructive notice that their land was ripe
for implied dedication for a public easement. The
appellate court reversed the judgement of the trial
court.

Maryland
Medford v. Cruz, No. 0073, Sept. Term, 2014, 2016
WL 4439992 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Aug. 23, 2016).
Owner 17 and Owner 18 filed concurrent suits to
quiet title as to the Disputed Area adjacent to their
jointly-owned pier. Owner 18 claimed legal and
equitable title to the Disputed Area based on past
conveyances and a quitclaim deed. Owner 17 argued,
however, that it had acquired title through adverse
possession, by way of tacking, from its predecessorsin-interest. Ultimately, the trial court found that
Owner 18 held title to the Disputed Area, subject to
an easement appurtenant as to Owner 17’s tract. The
court of appeals reversed, holding that the Disputed
Area was not among the assets Owner 18’s
predecessor had acquired by a certain court order,
and therefore Owner 18’s quitclaim deed was faulty
and had not vested in him title to the Disputed Area.
After a recitation of the property’s history, the court
concluded that Owner 17, in light of its predecessors’
use of the land, had acquired title by adverse
possession. First, the predecessors’ conduct of
mowing and removing debris from the Disputed Area
constituted actual occupancy. Next, because each
predecessor believed that the Disputed Area was part
of Lot 17, privity of estate satisfied continuity for the
statutory period. Last, the predecessors satisfied
hostility under color of title, evidenced by their
conduct on the land, and Owner 18 failed to prove
that the predecessors’ occupation was not hostile.

Prop. Reserve, Inc. v. Superior Court, 375 P.3d 887
(Cal. 2016).
California’s Department for Water Resources
(“Department”) sought to experiment with
environmental and geological conditions for the
construction of a tunnel or canal on private land
through statutory pre-condemnation procedures.
Department received a court order to perform the
environmental tests, but the court denied its
geological testing of drilling and refilling soil borings
because the legislature allegedly did not intend the
statute for use with deep drilling. After a series of
appeals and remands, the Supreme Court held the
statute did cover the testing based on the legislative
history and the continued use of terms “test holes”
and “borings.” For testing to avoid violation of the
takings clause, the statute requires a court order, a
court security deposit, and compensation for damages
from testing. The Supreme Court declared the precondemnation statute provide adequate measures for

Massachusetts
Nelson v. Conservation Com'n of Wayland, 90 Mass.
App. Ct. 133, 56 N.E.3d 889 (2016).
The landowner appealed a decision declaring a
portion of his property to be wetlands under
municipal bylaws, which provided a broader
definition than utilized in the Wetlands Protection
Act. The court found the declaration objectively
reasonable because fifty percent of the vegetation on
the landowner’s property constituted protected
vegetation and runoff water collects on the property.
Further, the absence of hydric soil on the property
does not, on its own, negate the lower courts finding.
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Oregon
Gilmour v. Linn Cty., 379 P.3d 833 (Or. Ct. App.
2016).

Dayton v. Jordan, A158858, 2016 WL 4013747 (Or.
Ct. App. July 27, 2016).

Farmer requested that County interpret the local code
to determine whether his straw compressing
operation amounted to “preparation of a farm crop”
permitted on land zoned exclusively for farm use.
The local code implemented a state statute defining
farm use. The County found that the compressing
operations amounted to processing, rather than
preparation, of a farm crop and was thus not a farm
use within the statute’s meaning. Farmer appealed to
the Land Use Board (“Board”), which reversed
County’s ruling. On judicial review, various parties
sought reversal of the Board’s decision, arguing that
the Board erred in concluding that the compression
operation constituted preparation because the Board
should defer to the County’s decision. First, the court
held that the Board did not have to defer to the
County because the regulation implemented a state
statute and was, therefore, a matter of statutory
construction. Finally, the court held that compression
of baled straw amounted to a farm use because, under
the statute, farm use included preparation, which
included packaging of farm products for market.
Therefore, the compression operation was a farm use
because it was at least similar to the packaging of
straw for market.

A property owner (“Owner”) and the adjacent
property owners (“Neighbor”) were rival ATV rental
businesses, but Owner owned the road on the border
of the properties that provided the only access to
nearby sand dunes. Owner brought quiet title action
against Neighbor and Neighbor claimed an implied
easement over the road based on the inclusion of the
road in a plat made for the transfer from the Owner’s
predecessor to the Neighbor. A later partition
describes an easement on the road but does not
provide a formal, deeded easement. The trial court
adopted the Neighbor’s argument in summary
judgment based on the plat and the reference to the
easement in the later partition. The appellate court
denied an implied easement because it lacked
evidence of intent to create an easement.
Furthermore, the trial court erred when it relied solely
on the depiction of a private road on a plat to
determine an implied easement; instead, Oregon
courts have traditionally considered factors such as
historical use of the land, the extent to which the
parties knew of that use, the terms of the conveyance
and the consideration given for the conveyance, and
the necessity of the easement.
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